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Abstract. Pseudorandomness is a classical model for the security of block ciphers.
In this paper we propose convenient tools in order to study it in connection with the
Shannon Theory, the Carter–Wegman universal hash functions paradigm, and the Luby–
Rackoff approach. This enables the construction of new ciphers with security proofs
under specific models. We show how to ensure security against basic differential and
linear cryptanalysis and even more general attacks. We propose practical construction
schemes.
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1. Introduction
Conventional encryption is used in order to enforce confidentiality of communications in
a network. Following the Kerckhoffs principles [34], schemes are defined by three public
algorithms: a key generation scheme, an encryption scheme, and a decryption scheme.
Two parties willing to communicate confidentially can generate a private key which is
used as a parameter for encryption and decryption. Here encryption and decryption are
formalized as functions C and D, respectively, such that D(C(x)) = x for any message x .
In 1949 Shannon formalized the notion of secrecy [59]. He formally proved the uncon-
ditional security (in his security model) of the Vernam cipher which had been published
in 1926 [71]. Unfortunately, this scheme happens to be quite expensive to implement for
networking because the sender and the receiver need to be synchronized, and they need
quite cumbersome huge keys. Shannon’s result also proves that unconditional security
cannot be achieved in a better (i.e. cheaper) way. For this reason, empirical security
seemed to be the only efficient alternative, and all secret key block ciphers which have
been publicly developed were considered to be secure until some researcher published a
dedicated attack on it. Therefore research mostly advanced like a tennis game between
designers and analysts.
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In the 70s the U.S. Government used to be far ahead of academic research on cryp-
tography. By releasing the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [1] without development
rationales, this paradoxically boosted research on block ciphers as researchers were
trying to reverse engineer or attack the design of DES. Real advances on the attack
strategies on block ciphers were made in the early 90s when Biham and Shamir invented
differential cryptanalysis and applied it against DES [7]–[10]. The best version of this
attack can recover a secret key with a simple 247-chosen plaintext attack.1 Although this
attack is heuristic, experiments confirmed the results. Biham and Shamir’s attack was
based on statistical cryptanalysis ideas which were later used by Gilbert and Chasse´
against another cipher [15], [16]. Those ideas inspired Matsui who developed a linear
cryptanalysis on DES [41], [42]. This heuristic attack, which has been implemented, can
recover the key with a 243-known plaintext attack. Since then, many researchers tried
to generalize and improve these attacks (see, for instance, [22], [27], [28], [30], [35],
[36], [37], [48], [61], [62]), but the underlying ideas were quite the same.
The basic idea of differential cryptanalysis is to use properties like “if x and x ′ are
two plaintext blocks such that x ′ = x ⊕ a, then it is likely that C(x ′) = C(x) ⊕ b”.2
Then the attack is an iterated two-chosen plaintexts attack which consists in getting the
encrypted values of two random plaintexts which verify x ′ = x ⊕ a until the special
event C(x ′) = C(x) ⊕ b occurs. Similarly, linear cryptanalysis consists in using the
probability Pr[C(x) ∈ H2/x ∈ H1] for two given hyperplanes H1 and H2. With the
GF(2) -vector space structure, hyperplanes are half-spaces, and this probability should
be close to 1/2. Linear cryptanalysis exploits the distance between this probability and
1/2 when it is large enough. More precisely, linear cryptanalysis is an incremental one-
known plaintext attack where we simply measure the correlation between the events
[x ∈ H1] and [C(x) ∈ H2].
Cryptanalysis is not restricted to destructive purposes. It also has a positive side
on which the analyst tries to prove the security of cryptographic schemes. Unlike the
negative aspects which can be purely intuitive (there is no need for proving that an attack
works if we can experiment it successfully), the positive aspects require more formal
and systematic results.
Instead of breaking or proposing new encryption functions, Nyberg first formalized
the notion of strength against differential cryptanalysis [50]. Similarly, Chabaud and
Vaudenay formalized the notion of strength against linear cryptanalysis [12]. With this
approach, we can study how to make internal computation boxes resistant against both
attacks. This can be used in a heuristic way by usual active s-boxes counting tricks (e.g.
see [22], [23]). This has also been used to construct the PURE cipher for which we can
prove the security against both attacks (see [52]), but in an unsatisfactory way which
introduces some algebraic properties which lead to other attacks as shown by Jakobsen
and Knudsen [26]. The Nyberg–Knudsen approach was later used by Matsui in practical
block ciphers including MISTY and KASUMI [2], [43], [44].
Another approach in order to study the security of block ciphers was introduced
1 Previously, the best known attack was an improvement of exhaustive search which required on average
254 DES computations by using the complementation property.
2 Here ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive OR function. However, this technique can be extended to any other
group law.
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by Luby and Rackoff in 19883 [40]. They have shown how to formalize security by
pseudorandomness and how to prove the security of the underlying DES construction—
the Feistel scheme [14]—provided that round functions are totally random. As for the
Shannon result, this suffers from the expensive cost of random bits, and basically requires
having an enormous private key. We can still use derandomization techniques, like the
Carter–Wegman method [11], [73] for sampling pairwise independent numbers. This
leads us to the notion of decorrelation which enables measuring the pseudorandomness
with small keys and studying how it protects against attacks.
Inspired by Carter and Wegman, we use simple primitives which we call NUT (for
“n-Universal Transformation”) since they are so cheap to implement. We propose con-
struction methods for block ciphers that we call COCONUT (for “Cipher Organized
with Cute Operations and NUT”), PEANUT (for “Pretty Encryption Algorithm with
NUT”), and WALNUT (for “Wonderful Algorithm with Light NUT”). Our construction
is based on a theory which mixes all previous results and happens to offer new ways of
investigation for research on block ciphers.
1.1. Related Work
Several researchers concentrated on the positive side of cryptanalysis: security argu-
ments. Usually block cipher designers try to upper bound the probability of the best
differential or linear characteristics in ad hoc ways. Some results apply to multi-path
characteristics like Nyberg–Knudsen [51], [52], Aoki–Ohta [3], Keliher et al. [32], [33],
and Park et al. [53], [54].
In another approach, Luby–Rackoff [39] and Maurer–Massey [45] studied the security
of product ciphers.
One of our purpose is to quantify the security against ciphers when a limited number
d of samples are available, starting from the seminal work Luby–Rackoff [40] related
to Feistel schemes [14]. Some extensions investigated the security with higher values of
d, e.g. [46] and [56]. Many other researchers have applied the same techniques to other
schemes. (See, for instance, [19], [24], [25], [31], [47] and [49].)
Our work studies provable security against specific models of attacks. We addressed
basic differential and linear cryptanalysis and the more general model of iterated attacks
which are based on a (low) specific number d of plaintext/ciphertext samples. Our work
was further extended by Junod [29] with techniques using statistics.
Some papers related to the theory presented in this article are collected on [66].
1.2. Structure of This Article
The paper is organized as follows. First we give some definitions on decorrelation (Sec-
tion 2) and basic constructions for NUTs (Section 3). Then we investigate connections to
Shannon’s perfect secrecy notion (Section 4). We show how to express security results in
the Luby–Rackoff security model (Section 5). We prove how pairwise decorrelation can
protect a cipher against basic differential and linear cryptanalysis (Sections 6.1 and 6.2).
We generalize those results with the notion of “iterated attacks of order d” (Section 6.3).
3 An earlier version was presented at the CRYPTO ’85 conference.
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Then we apply decorrelation upper bounds to practical constructions such as Feistel ci-
phers (Section 7). Finally, we define the COCONUT, PEANUT, and WALNUT families
(Section 8).
1.3. Notations
In what follows we use the following notations:
◦: composition of two functions: f ◦ g is a function which maps x onto
f (g(x)),
R: set of real numbers,
GF(q): finite field with q elements,
Md : set of all sequences which consist of d elements of a set M,
AdvA: advantage of a distinguisher A (see Section 5),
1P : variable which is set to 1 if the predicate P is satisfied or to 0 otherwise,
DPc(a, b): differential probability of a function c with characteristic (a, b) (see Sec-
tion 6.1),
LPc(a, b): linear probability of a function c with characteristic (a, b) (see Sec-
tion 6.2).
We represent all random variables by capital letters. They are associated to a probability
distribution which will be clear from the context. For instance, X may denote a random
variable and Pr[X = x] may represent the probability that it takes a given value x .
Given finite sets I and J , a real matrix A of type I × J is defined by an array of
real numbers whose row indices and column indices run in I and J , respectively. We let
RI×J denote the set of all these matrices. The term in row i and column j is denoted Ai, j .
In Section 2.4 four norms ‖A‖2, N∞(A), |||A|||∞, and ‖A‖a of the matrix A are defined.
Random functions or permutations will be considered. They will be represented by
random variables, e.g. F or C . Section 2.1 defines the matrix [F]d or [C]d for any positive
integer d . Random functions or permutations with “ideal” distributions will be denoted
with a star superscript as F∗ or C∗.
2. Decorrelation
2.1. Block Ciphers, Random Functions, Distribution Matrices
In what follows, we consider ciphers as random permutations C on a message-block
space M. Since we are considering block ciphers, for simplicity reasons, messages are
considered as elements of M, which is assumed to be a finite set. In most practical
cases, we have M = {0, 1}m . We emphasize C being a random permutation. Here the
randomness comes from the random choice of the secret key. In particular, for any (fixed)
permutation c overM, there is a probability Pr[C = c] that the C instance is equal to c.
Definition 1. Given a random function F from a given set M1 to a given set M2 and
an integer d , we define the d-wise distribution matrix [F]d of F as anMd1 ×Md2 matrix
where the (x, y)-entry of [F]d corresponding to the multi-points x = (x1, . . . , xd) ∈Md1
and y = (y1, . . . , yd) ∈Md2 is defined as the probability that we simultaneously have
F(xi ) = yi for i = 1, . . . , d. We denote it [F]dx,y = Pr[x
F→ y].
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Basically, each row of the d-wise distribution matrix corresponds to the distribution
of the d-tuple (F(x1), . . . , F(xd)) where (x1, . . . , xd) corresponds to the index of the
row. Intuitively, every experiment (or attack) on C with d samples will provide some
information on some simultaneous equations C(xi ) = yi . The experiment probability
will thus correspond to a cell in the [C]d matrix.
2.2. Perfect Decorrelation
The d-wise distribution matrix of a random function intuitively defines its d-wise decor-
relation. There is no precise definition of decorrelation, only ways to compare some, and
models for perfect decorrelation. Two random functions have the same d-wise decorre-
lation if and only if their d-wise distribution matrices are equal.
A random function (or a random permutation) will be compared with an ideal version
of it which will have to be specified. Then we will be able to compare the decorrelations
of the function (or permutation) and its ideal version. For example, a block cipher C over
M is compared with the ideal block cipher C∗ overM which is defined to be a random
permutation over M with uniform distribution. Note that for M = {0, 1}m , we need
log2(2m!) ≈ m2m bits in order to specify fully an instance of C∗, which is enormous. If
C and C∗ have the same decorrelation to the order d, we say that the d-wise decorrelation
of the cipher C is perfect.
Similarly a random function F from M1 to M2 is compared with a uniformly dis-
tributed random function F∗ from M1 to M2. We say that the d-wise decorrelation of
the random function F is perfect if F and F∗ have the same d-wise decorrelation.
Let F be a random function fromM1 toM2. Saying that the function F has a perfect
1-wise decorrelation means that for any x1 the distribution of F(x1) is uniform.
Saying that the function F has a perfect 2-wise decorrelation means that for any x1 = x2
the random variables F(x1) and F(x2) are uniformly distributed and independent. This is
exactly the notion of strongly universal2 function as defined by Wegman and Carter [73].
Saying that a cipher C on M has a perfect 2-wise decorrelation means that for any
x1 = x2, the random variable (C(x1),C(x2)) is uniformly distributed among all the
(y1, y2) pairs such that y1 = y2. This is exactly the notion of pairwise independent
permutation as defined by Wegman and Carter [73].
2.3. Decorrelation Distance
The previous section provides a qualitative way to compare decorrelations. Here we
introduce a quantitative way to do the same.
Definition 2. Given two random functions F and G from a given setM1 to a given set
M2, an integer d and a distance D over the matrix space RMd1×Md2 , we call D([F]d , [G]d)
the d-wise decorrelation D-distance between F and G. When G is the ideal version of
F and is clear from the context we call D([F]d , [G]d) the d-wise decorrelation D-bias
of F .
A decorrelation distance of zero means that for any multi-point x = (x1, . . . , xd) the
multi-points (F(x1), . . . , F(xd)) and (G(x1), . . . ,G(xd)) have the same distribution, so
that F and G have the same decorrelation.
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2.4. Classical Distances
For the purpose of our treatment, we define the L2 norm, the infinity weighted pseudo-
norm N∞, the L∞-associated matrix norm ||| · |||∞, and the ‖ · ‖a norm4 on RMd1×Md2 by
‖A‖2 =
√∑
x,y
(
Ax,y
)2
, (1)
N∞(A) = max
x,y
|Ax,y |
Pr[x C
∗→ y]
(2)
|||A|||∞ = max
x
∑
y
|Ax,y |, (3)
‖A‖a = max
x1
∑
y1
· · ·max
xd
∑
yd
|Ax,y |, (4)
where C∗ is the perfect cipher, x = (x1, . . . , xd) ∈Md1 , and y = (y1, . . . , yd) ∈Md2 .
For (2) we use the convention that 0/0 = 0 and c/0 is undefined for c = 0. Thus the N∞
is not always defined. We can check that it is always defined when A = [C1]d − [C2]d
for any random permutations C1 and C2. Hence N∞ still defines a distance in order to
compare decorrelation of permutations.
We recall properties of matrix norms. First, ‖ · ‖2, ||| · |||∞, and ‖ · ‖a are norms, which
means that
1. ‖A‖ = 0 if and only if A is the identically zero matrix,
2. ‖u · A‖ = |u| · ‖A‖ for any real number u,
3. ‖A + B‖ ≤ ‖A‖ + ‖B‖.
The latter property is the “triangular inequality”. We easily check these properties for
‖ · ‖2, ||| · |||∞, and ‖ · ‖a . In addition, these are matrix norms, which means that we have
the extra property (called “multiplicativity”)
4. ‖A × B‖ ≤ ‖A‖ · ‖B‖ whenever we can make the matrix product A × B.
This property is quite well known for ‖ · ‖2 and ||| · |||∞.5 We prove it for the ‖ · ‖a norm.
Lemma 3. Given two matrices A ∈ RMd1×Md2 and B ∈ RMd2×Md3 , we have‖A×B‖a ≤
‖A‖a · ‖B‖a .
Proof. We prove it by induction on d. For d = 1 this is simply the result on the ||| · |||∞
norm.
Given x1 ∈M1 and y1 ∈M2, we define πx1,y1(A) ∈ RM
d−1
1 ×Md−12 by
(πx1,y1(A))(x2,...,xd ),(y2,...,yd ) = A(x1,...,xd ),(y1,...,yd ).
4 This norm was first introduced in [70].
5 It comes from the Cauchy–Schwarz property for ‖ · ‖2 and from the link |||A||| = maxv =0(‖Av‖/‖v‖)
with a vector norm for ||| · |||∞.
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We notice that
‖A‖a = max
x1
∑
y1
‖πx1,y1(A)‖a .
We similarly define πy1,z1(B) and πx1,z1(A× B). We have similar observations for ‖B‖a
and ‖A × B‖a . Obviously we have
πx1,z1(A × B) =
∑
y1
πx1,y1(A)× πy1,z1(B).
Using the triangular inequality and the induction hypothesis, we have
‖A × B‖a ≤ max
x1
∑
z1
∑
y1
‖πx1,y1(A)‖a · ‖πy1,z1(B)‖a .
By considering matrices in RM1×M2 and RM2×M3 whose terms are the ‖πx1,y1(A)‖a
and ‖πy1,z1(B)‖a values we notice that this expression is yet another ||| · |||∞ norm of a
matrix product. Hence
‖A × B‖a ≤
(
max
x1
∑
y1
‖πx1,y1(A)‖a
)
.
(
max
y1
∑
z1
‖πy1,z1(B)‖a
)
,
which is nothing but ‖A × B‖a ≤ ‖A‖a · ‖B‖a .
We also recall properties of distances. A distance D is such that
1. D(A, B) = 0 if and only if A = B,
2. D(A, B) = D(B, A),
3. D(A,C) ≤ D(A, B)+ D(B,C).
Matrix norms define distances by D(A, B) = ‖A−B‖. We easily check that N∞ defines
a distance on distribution matrices of ciphers as well.
In [70] the‖·‖s norm is introduced. It is used in order to study super-pseudorandomness
whereas ‖ · ‖a is used in order to study randomness. For simplicity we omit it in the
paper, but we put discussion of it in Appendix B.
2.5. Multiplicativity of Decorrelation Distances
Theorem 4. Let C1, . . . ,Cr be independent ciphers over M. We consider C = Cr ◦
· · · ◦C1 the product cipher. We let C∗ be the perfect cipher overM. For the distance D
defined by either ‖ · ‖2, ||| · |||∞, ‖ · ‖a , or N∞ we have
D([C]d , [C∗]d) ≤
r∏
i=1
D([Ci ]d , [C∗]d).
It will be shown that the distance D characterizes the weakness of a cipher. Hence this
theorem means that the weakness is multiplicative in a product cipher. This property
makes the decorrelation bias of ciphers a multiplicative combinatorial measurement for
those distances. It is quite convenient to prove the amplification phenomenon in product
ciphers.
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Proof. By induction we only need to prove it for r = 2. Let C1 and C2 be two
independent random permutations overM. We notice that [C2 ◦C1]d = [C1]d × [C2]d .
For any i we notice that Ci ◦ C∗, C∗ ◦ Ci , and C∗ have the same distribution. Hence
we have [Ci ◦ C∗]d = [C∗ ◦ Ci ]d = [C∗]d .
From those observations we notice that
[C2 ◦ C1]d − [C∗]d = ([C1]d − [C∗]d)× ([C2]d − [C∗]d).
We recall that the ‖ · ‖2, ||| · |||∞, and ‖ · ‖a norms are matrix norms, i.e. ‖A × B‖ ≤
‖A‖ · ‖B‖. Therefore
‖[C2 ◦ C1]d − [C∗]d‖ ≤ ‖[C1]d − [C∗]d‖ · ‖[C2]d − [C∗]d‖
for those norms. We easily check that we have a similar property for the N∞ distance.
3. Decorrelation Modules
The aim of this section is to provide cheap and efficient decorrelated random functions or
permutations. We call them NUT, for n-Universal Transformations, in order to remind
us of the Carter–Wegman notion of universal function and to emphasize their low cost.
3.1. NUT-0: Perfect 1-Wise Decorrelated Permutations over a Group
Perfect 1-wise decorrelation is easy to achieve with permutations when the message-
block space M is given a group structure. We let + denote the group law in M. We
can use C(x) = x + K where K is a uniformly distributed random key onM, which is
exactly the Vernam cipher [71]. This primitive plays an important role in the construction
of block ciphers, e.g. in order to construct Markov ciphers (see [37]) or in the Nyberg–
Knudsen construction [52].
3.2. NUT-I: Perfect Decorrelated Functions over a Finite Field
Perfect decorrelated functions are easy to construct whenM is given a finite field struc-
ture. We can take F(x) = K1 + K2x + K3x2 + · · ·+ Kd xd−1 where K = (K1, . . . , Kd)
is a uniformly distributed random key onMd . This random function has perfect d-wise
decorrelation due to the Lagrange interpolation principle. This builds perfect decorrela-
tion functions to arbitrary orders. Perfect decorrelated permutations to arbitrary orders
are much harder to construct.
3.3. NUT-II: Perfect Pairwise Decorrelated Permutations over a Finite Field
We can construct perfect pairwise decorrelated ciphers on a field structure M as well
by C(x) = K1 + K2 · x where K = (K1, K2) is uniform in M×M∗.6
6 HereM∗ denotes the set of all non-zero field elements.
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3.4. NUT-III: Modulo p -Based Pairwise Decorrelated Functions for the L2 Norm
On the standard space M = {0, 1}m , our previous construction requires implementing
arithmetic on the finite field GF(2m), which may lead to a poor encryption rate on software
for large m. We can take advantage of built-in integer multiplication by approximating
the previous construction. The decorrelation is no longer perfect though.
Theorem 5. Let F(x) = K1 + K2 · x mod p for p = (1 − δ)2m prime and K1, K2
independent uniformly distributed random variables inM = {0, . . . , 2m−1}. We assume
that 114 ≥ δ ≥ 0. F is a random function fromM toM. Let F∗ be a uniformly distributed
random function from M to M. We have ‖[F]2 − [F∗]2‖2 ≤ 2
√
2δ.
The proof is given in [65].
Note that the pairwise ||| · |||∞-decorrelation of this primitive is pretty bad since the
distribution of (F(x1), F(x2)) is odd when x1 = x2+ p: we always have F(x1) = F(x2).
We can however use this primitive in order to amplify the decorrelation of random cipher
in the sense of the L2 norm and still obtain provable security bounds.
3.5. NUT-IV: Modulo p -Based Decorrelated Functions for the ‖ · ‖a Norm
Here instead of taking p smaller than 2m as in the previous construction, we take p larger
than 2m .
Theorem 6. Let F(x) = (K1 + K2x + K3x2 + · · · + Kd xd−1 mod p) mod 2m for
p = (1+δ)2m prime, δ ≥ 0, and K1, . . . , Kd independent uniformly distributed random
variables in M = {0, . . . , 2m − 1}. F is a random function from M to M. Let F∗ be
a uniformly distributed random function from M to M. We have ‖[F]d − [F∗]d‖a ≤
2((1 + δ)d − 1).
This theorem generalizes to any finite field GF(p) with p not necessarily prime, and any
M when using any injective representation from M to GF(p) for x and the Ki ’s and
using any surjective mapping from GF(p) to M instead of the modulo 2m reduction.
(See Theorem 7 of [70].)
The proof of this theorem requires materials from Section 5. We provide it in
Appendix A.
Note that a similar construction has been previously used by Halevi and Krawczyk
for authentication in the MMH algorithm [21].
3.6. NUT-V: 3-Wise Decorrelated Permutations over a Finite Field
A similar way to construct (almost) perfect 3-wise decorrelated permutation on a field
structure M is by C(x) = a + b/(x + c) where K = (a, b, c) with b = 0. (By
convention we set 1/0 = 0.) We can prove that ‖[C]3 − [C∗]3‖a ≤ 6/q, where q is the
field cardinality, with the same techniques as for Theorem 6. (See [4].)
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4. Links to the Shannon Secrecy Theory
4.1. Perfect Secrecy and Decorrelation
Shannon defines security by the notion of perfect secrecy [59]. Perfect secrecy is a
property of a cipher and a random plaintext source. We say that C provides perfect
secrecy for a given distribution of X if H(X/C(X)) = H(X) where H denotes the
Shannon entropy,7 or equivalently if X and C(X) have independent distributions. We
can also consider ciphers C which provide perfect secrecy for any distribution of X . This
means that the distribution of C(x) does not depend on x .
In Shannon’s formalism, X denotes the full stream of plaintext that we want to en-
crypt whereas X denotes one plaintext block in our approach. We usually bring the
two approaches together by considering C as a one-time cipher which encrypts a single
plaintext (big) block.
Obviously, if C is a perfect 1-wise decorrelated cipher, then C provides perfect secrecy
for any plaintext source since C(x) is uniformly distributed for any x . The Vernam cipher
(see Section 3.1) is an example.
We easily capture the notion of a chosen plaintext or ciphertext attack with the fol-
lowing generalization.
Theorem 7. Let C be a cipher with a perfect d-wise decorrelation. For any x1, . . . ,
xd−1, if X is a random variable such that X = xi , then
H(X/C(x1), . . . ,C(xd−1),C(X)) = H(X).
This means that if an adversary knows d−1 pairs (xi ,C(xi )) (either by a chosen plaintext
or ciphertext attack), for any yd which is different from all C(xi )’s, his knowledge of
C−1(yd) is nothing more than knowing that it is different from all xi ’s.
Proof. From the definitions, straightforward computations show that for any random
variable X we have
H(X/C(x1), . . . ,C(xd−1),C(X)) = H(X)+ p log2 p,
where p = Pr[X = xi ; i = 1, . . . , d − 1]. Since we know that our X is different from
all xi we have p = 0.
4.2. Key Length Lower Bound
The Shannon approach enables proving a lower bound on the private key length for
ciphers which achieve perfect secrecy for any plaintext source. More precisely, the
Shannon theorem proves that if C provides perfect secrecy for any distribution of the
plaintexts over M, then H(C) ≥ log2 #M. This means that the key parameter in C
7 We recall that by definition H(X) = −∑
x
Pr[X = x] log2 Pr[X = x] with the convention that 0 log2 0 =
0, and that H(X/Y ) = H(X, Y )− H(Y ) where H(X, Y ) is the entropy of the joint variable Z = (X, Y ).
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needs to have at least log2 #M bits to be at least as long as the plaintext. The Vernam
cipher achieves the equality case.
We can prove a similar result for perfect decorrelation.
Theorem 8. If F is a random function from M1 to M2 with perfect d-wise decorre-
lation (for d ≤ #M1), then H(F) ≥ d · log2 #M2. If C is a cipher overM with perfect
d-wise decorrelation, then H(C) ≥ d · log2 #M − d2/#M − o(d2/#M) as d/#M
decreases toward zero.
Proof. Let x1, . . . , xd be d pairwise different points in M1. Since F has a perfect
d-wise decorrelation, then Y = (F(x1), . . . , F(xd)) is uniformly distributed in Md2 .
Hence we have H(Y ) = d · log2 #M2. Due to the property of joint entropy we have
H(F, Y ) ≥ H(Y ). However, F fully determines Y , hence H(F, Y ) = H(F), thus
H(F) ≥ d · log2 #M2.
For ciphers we do the same. Y happens to be uniformly distributed among all multi-
points with pairwise different entries. We have N = #M(#M − 1) · · · (#M − d + 1)
values which is greater than (#M−d)d . We obtain H(C) ≥ log2 N ≥ d · log2(#M−d).
Hence
H(C) ≥ d · log2 #M+ d · log2
(
1 − d
#M
)
.
The result then comes from log(1 − ε) = −ε − o(ε).
5. Security against Distinguishers with Limited Oracle Accesses
In the Luby–Rackoff model [40], an attacker is an infinitely powerful Turing machineAO
which has access to an oracle O. Her aim is to distinguish a cipher C from the perfect
cipher C∗ by querying the oracle with a limited number d of inputs. The oracle O
implements either C or C∗. The attacker must finally answer 0 (“reject”) or 1 (“accept”).
We measure the ability to distinguish C from C∗ by the advantage AdvA = |p − p∗|
where p (resp. p∗) is the probability of accepting C (resp C∗), i.e. the probability of
answering 1 if O implements C (resp. C∗).
5.1. d-Limited Distinguishers and N∞-Decorrelation
Since we put no upper bound on the computational capability of the distinguisher (the
only limitation is on the number of queries to the oracle), we can assume without loss of
generality that the best one is fully deterministic. Hence it can be defined by functions
f1, . . . , fd and an acceptance set A as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Theorem 9. Let d be an integer, and let C be a cipher. For any distinguisher between
C and the perfect cipher C∗ which is limited to d queries (as depicted in Fig. 1), we have
AdvFig. 1 ≤ N∞([C]d − [C∗]d),
where the N∞ norm is defined by (2).
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Parameters: functions f1, . . . , fd , a set A
Oracle: a permutation c
1: select a fixed message X1 = f1() and get Y1 = c(X1)
2: calculate a message X2 = f2(Y1) and get Y2 = c(X2)
3: . . .
4: calculate a message Xd = fd(Y1, . . . , Yd−1) and get Yd = c(Xd)
5: if Y = (Y1, . . . , Yd) ∈ A, output 1, otherwise output 0
Fig. 1. A general d-limited distinguisher.
In particular, we have unconditional security when the decorrelation is perfect and we
still have a proven quantified security when the decorrelation is small.
Proof. Obviously we have
p =
∑
y∈A
Pr[x C→ y],
where y = (y1, . . . , yd) and x = (x1, . . . , xd) with xi = fi (y1, . . . , yi−1) in the sum.
Since Pr[x C→ y] ≤ (1 + ε)Pr[x C∗→ y] with ε = N∞([C]d − [C∗]d), we have
p ≤ (1 + ε)
∑
y∈A
Pr[x C
∗→ y] = (1 + ε)p∗,
so we have p − p∗ ≤ ε for any attacker. We can apply this result to the attacker which
produces the opposite output to show that |p − p∗| ≤ ε.
5.2. Best Non-Adaptive Distinguisher and ||| · |||∞-Decorrelation
Here is a more precise theorem in the non-adaptive case. We call a distinguisher “non-
adaptive” if no Xi queried to the oracle depends on some previous answers Yj (see
Fig. 2).
Theorem 10. Let d be an integer and let C be a cipher. The best d-limited non-adaptive
distinguisher (as depicted in Fig. 2) for C is such that
AdvFig. 2 = 12 |||[C]d − [C∗]d |||∞,
where the ||| · |||∞ norm is defined by (3) and C∗ is the perfect cipher.
Proof. The best attack is fully characterized by x = (x1, . . . , xd) and A. With the
notations of Theorem 9, we have
p =
∑
y
1y∈A Pr[x C→ y],
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Parameters: values X1, . . . , Xd , a set A
Oracle: a permutation c
1: select some fixed messages X = (X1, . . . , Xd)
2: get Y = (c(X1), . . . , c(Xd))
3: if Y ∈ A, output 1, otherwise, output 0
Fig. 2. A d-limited non-adaptive distinguisher.
thus, we have
Adv =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y
1y∈A(Pr[x C→ y] − Pr[x C
∗→ y])
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Looking for the best distinguisher thus consists of maximizing this expression over all
possible choices for x and A. We can easily see that this maximum is obtained when A
consists of all y’s such that Pr[x C→ y] − Pr[x C∗→ y] have the same sign. Since the full
sum for all y is zero, the sum of all positive terms is equal to the sum of negative terms,
hence half of the sum of all absolute values. Hence for the best distinguisher
Adv = max
x
1
2
∑
y
|Pr[x C→ y] − Pr[x C∗→ y]|.
We can recognize here the ||| · |||∞ distance between [C]d and [C∗]d .
5.3. Best Adaptive Distinguisher and ‖ · ‖a-Decorrelation
We can extend Theorem 10 and get a more precise result than Theorem 9.
Theorem 11. Let d be an integer and let C be a cipher. The best d-limited distinguisher
(as depicted in Fig. 1) for C is such that
AdvFig. 1 = 12‖[C]d − [C∗]d‖a,
where the ‖ · ‖a norm is defined by (4) and C∗ is the perfect cipher.
This motivates the introduction of the ‖ · ‖a norm.
Proof. The best attack is fully characterized by f1, . . . , fd andA. As for Theorem 10,
for the optimal distinguisher we have
Adv = 12
∑
y
|[C]dx,y − [C∗]dx,y |
with xi = fi (y1, . . . , yi−1). By maximizing this expression in terms of f1, . . . , fd we
obtain Adv = 12‖[C]d − [C∗]d‖a .
262 S. Vaudenay
Parameters: a complexity n, a characteristic (a, b)
Oracle: a permutation c
1: for i from 1 to n do
2: pick uniformly a random X and query for c(X) and c(X + a)
3: if c(X + a) = c(X)+ b, output 1 and stop
4: end for
5: output 0
Fig. 3. Differential distinguisher.
6. Resistance against Iterated Attacks
Since resisting against general d-limited distinguishers for d large costs too many bits
of randomness in the private keys (as Theorem 8 says), we can wonder how useful
this theory is for practical ciphers. In this section we investigate some particular class
of distinguishers which capture many of the existing attack methods. We show that
decorrelation with low degree is enough to resist them.
6.1. Differential Cryptanalysis
In this section we assume that M is given a group structure of order M . (Typically
we consider M = {0, 1}m and the XOR group law.) We study the security of pairwise
decorrelated ciphers against basic differential cryptanalysis.
Let C be a cipher on M and let C∗ be the perfect cipher.
Most differential cryptanalysis of r -round block ciphers based on the Biham and
Shamir attack (see [9] and [10]) use a simple distinguisher between r − i rounds (for
i = 1, 2, or 3) of the cipher and the perfect cipher. This distinguisher uses a fixed pair
(a, b) ∈M2 with a = 0 and is depicted in Fig. 3.
We define
DPC(a, b) = Pr
X
[C(X + a) = C(X)+ b],
where X has a uniform distribution. It is well known that differential cryptanalysis
depends on this quantity (see, for instance, [50]). This quantity depends on the choice of
the cipher (i.e. on the key). Here we focus on average complexities of attacks with no prior
information on the key.8 For this we concentrate on the average value E(DPC(a, b)),
over the distribution of C . We first mention that E(DPC(a, b)) has an interesting linear
expression with respect to the pairwise distribution matrix of C . Namely, straightforward
computation shows that
E(DPC(a, b)) = 1
M
∑
x1 ,x2
y1 ,y2
1 x2=x1+a
y2=y1+b
Pr[(x1, x2) C→ (y1, y2)]. (5)
8 The problem of successful attacks for sets of weak keys is not our purpose here.
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Lemma 12. For the distinguisher of Fig. 3 between C and the perfect cipher C∗ over
the group M of order M we have
AdvFig. 3 ≤ n · max
(
1
M − 1 , E(DP
C(a, b))
)
.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that the probability pc, for some fixed oracle c, that
the attack accepts c is
pc = 1 − (1 − DPc(a, b))n,
which is less than n · DPc(a, b). The probability that it accepts C is p = E(pC) ≤
n · E(DPC(a, b)). Since from (5) we have E(DPC∗(a, b)) = 1/(M − 1), we obtain the
result.
Theorem 13. Let C be a cipher on a group M of order M and let C∗ be the perfect
cipher. For any basic differential distinguisher between C and C∗ (depicted in Fig. 3) of
complexity n, we have
AdvFig. 3 ≤ nM − 1 +
n
2
|||[C]2 − [C∗]2|||∞.
Note that this result holds for differential cryptanalysis with any group law and captures
the notion of multi-path differential.
Proof. We first consider the distinguisher with n = 1. It is a non-adaptive distinguisher
limited to two queries. Due to Theorem 10, this is less than 12 |||[C]2 − [C∗]|||∞. As in
the proof of Lemma 12, we obtain that it is further equal to∣∣∣∣E(DPC(a, b))− 1M − 1
∣∣∣∣ .
Thus
E(DPC(a, b)) ≤ 1
M − 1 +
1
2 |||[C]2 − [C∗]|||∞.
We conclude by using Lemma 12.
So, if the pairwise decorrelation bias has the order of 1/M , basic differential cryptanalysis
cannot work against C unless its complexity reaches the order of magnitude of M .
6.2. Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis has been invented by Matsui [41], [42] based on the notion of
statistical attacks which are due to Gilbert and coworkers [15], [16], [60]. As for differ-
ential cryptanalysis, we study here the underlying distinguisher against r − i rounds for
small i .
In this section we assume that M = {0, 1}m . The inner dot product a · b in {0, 1}m is
the parity of the bitwise AND of a and b.
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Parameters: a complexity n, a characteristic (a, b), a set A
Oracle: a permutation c
1: initialize the counter value u to zero
2: for i from 1 to n do
3: pick a random X with a uniform distribution and query for c(X)
4: if X · a = c(X) · b, increment the counter u
5: end for
6: if u ∈ A, output 1, otherwise output 0
Fig. 4. Linear distinguisher.
Let C be a cipher on M and let C∗ be the perfect cipher.
As in Section 6.1, we similarly call the basic linear distinguisher the distinguisher
characterized by a pair (a, b) ∈M2 with b = 0 which is depicted in Fig. 4. We notice
here that the attack depends on the way it accepts or rejects, based on the final counter
u value.
As pointed out by Chabaud and Vaudenay [12], linear cryptanalysis is based on the
quantity
LPC(a, b) = (2 Pr
X
[X · a = C(X) · b] − 1)2.
(Here we use Matsui’s notations taken from [43].) As for differential cryptanalysis, we
focus on E(LPC(a, b)), and there is a linear expression of this mean value in terms of
the pairwise distribution matrix [C]2 which comes from straightforward computations,
as shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 14. Given a random permutation C over {0, 1}m , for any a and b, we have
E(LPC(a, b)) = 2−2m
∑
x1 ,x2
y1 ,y2
(−1)(x1⊕x2)·a+(y1⊕y2)·b Pr[(x1, x2) C→ (y1, y2)]
= 1 − 22−2m
∑
x1 =x2
y1 =y2
1 x1 ·a=y1 ·b
x2 ·a =y2 ·b
Pr[(x1, x2) C→ (y1, y2)].
If C has a uniform distribution, a = 0, and b = 0, we have E(LPC(a, b)) =
1/(2m − 1). Note that E(LPC(0, b)) = 0 for b = 0.
Proof. In order to prove it, we first notice that 2 PrX [X · a = C(X) · b] − 1 =
E((−1)X ·a+C(X)·b)), and we express LPC(a, b) as
LPC(a, b) = E((−1)(X1⊕X2)·a+(C(X1)⊕C(X2))·b),
where X1 and X2 are independent uniformly distributed random variables. We have
E(LPC(a, b)) = 2−2m
∑
x1 ,x2
y1 ,y2
(−1)(x1⊕x2)·a+(y1⊕y2)·b Pr[(x1, x2) C→ (y1, y2)].
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The contribution of terms for which x1 = x2 is equal to 2−m . Considering that C is a
permutation we can concentrate on x1 = x2 and y1 = y2. Then we split the remaining
sum into four groups depending on the two bits (x1 · a⊕ y1 · b, x2 · a⊕ y2 · b). Let 
b1,b2
be the sum of all probabilities for which the two bits are (b1, b2), x1 = x2, and y1 = y2.
We have
E(LPC(a, b)) = 2−m + 2−2m
0,0 − 2−2m
0,1 − 2−2m
1,0 + 2−2m
1,1.
Due to symmetry we have 
0,1 = 
1,0. Furthermore, the sum of the four sums is
2m(2m − 1). Hence
E(LPC(a, b)) = 2−m + 2−2m × 2m(2m − 1)− 4 × 2−2m
0,1,
which leads to our second result. Computations when C is uniformly distributed are
straightforward.
Lemma 15. For the distinguisher of Fig. 4 we let pc be the probability that the output
is 1 given an oracle c. We let p0 be the probability that it outputs 1 when the counter is
incremented with probability 12 in each iteration instead of querying the oracle. We have
|pc − p0| ≤ 2
√
n · LPc(a, b).
Furthermore, the maximum for |pc − p0| is asymptotically equivalent to
(1/
√
2π)
√
n · LPc(a, b) when n increases and LPc(a, b) = o(1/n).
Proof. We first express the probability pc that the distinguisher accepts c. Let Ni be
the random variable defined as being 1 or 0 depending on whether or not we have X ·a =
c(X)·b in the i th iteration. All Ni ’s are independent and with the same 0-or-1 distribution.
Let z be the probability that Ni = 1. We also define θ = 2z − 1 =
√
LPc(a, b). We thus
want to prove that |pc − p0| ≤ 2θ
√
n. We have
pc =
∑
u∈A
(n
u
)
zu(1 − z)n−u,
thus
pc − p0 =
∑
u∈A
(n
u
)(
zu(1 − z)n−u − 1
2n
)
.
We would like to upper bound |pc − p0| over all possibleA depending on z. Since z and
1− z play a symmetric role we assume without loss of generality that z ≥ 12 . For z = 12 ,
the result is trivially true, so from now on we assume that z > 12 . Since z
u(1 − z)n−u is
an increasing function in terms of u we have
max
A
|pc − p0| =
n∑
u=k
(n
u
)(
zu(1 − z)n−u − 1
2n
)
,
where k is the least integer u such that the difference in parentheses is non-negative, i.e.
k = 1 +
⌊
n
log 12 − log(1 − z)
log z − log(1 − z)
⌋
.
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Replacing u by n/2 in the same expression in parentheses we obtain a negative difference.
Hence k ≥ (n + 1)/2. Similarly, replacing u by n · z, the expression in parentheses turns
out to be an increasing function in terms of z which is 0 for z = 12 . Since z > 12 we
obtain that k ≤ n · z. Therefore (n − 1)/2 ≤ k − 1 ≤ (n − 1)z + z.
If n = 1, we have k = 1 thus maxA |pc − p0| = z − 12 so the result holds. If n = 2,
we have k ≥ 32 , thus k = 2 and
max
A
|pc − p0| = (z − 12 )(z + 12 ) ≤ 32 (z − 12 ),
so the result holds as well. We now concentrate on n ≥ 3.
We use the following identity taken from [58]:9
n∑
u=k
(n
u
)
zu(1 − z)n−u = k
(n
k
) ∫ z
0
t k−1(1 − t)n−k dt. (6)
We obtain
max
A
|pc − p0| = k
(n
k
) ∫ z
1/2
t k−1(1 − t)n−k dt, (7)
thus
|pc − p0| ≤ k
(n
k
)
(z − 12 ) maxt∈[0,1](t
k−1(1 − t)n−k).
The maximum is obtained for t = (k − 1)/(n − 1), hence
|pc − p0| ≤ k
(n
k
)
(z − 12 )
(k − 1)k−1(n − k)n−k
(n − 1)n−1 .
Let x = 2(k − 1)/(n − 1) − 1. We have k − 1 = (n − 1)(1 + x)/2 and
n − k = (n − 1)(1 − x)/2. We have 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and
|pc − p0| ≤ k
(n
k
)
(z − 12 )
1
2n−1
((1 + x)1+x (1 − x)1−x )(n−1)/2.
By using
k
(n
k
)
= n
(
n − 1
k − 1
)
and the Stirling approximation we obtain that this bound is asymptotically equal to
θ
√
n/
√
2π , so the bound we want to prove is not so loose.
We can easily prove that (1 + x)1+x (1 − x)1−x ≤ 22x2 . Hence
|pc − p0| ≤ k
(n
k
)
(z − 12 )
1
2n−1
2(n−1)x2 .
Since k−1 ≤ (n−1)z+z we have x ≤ θ+θ/(n − 1)+1/(n − 1) = (nθ + 1)/(n − 1).
Thus
|pc − p0| ≤ θ ×
[
k
(n
k
)
(1/2n)
]
× 2(nθ+1)2/(n−1).
9 We can easily prove it by derivating it in terms of z.
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For n = 3 we have k ( nk ) (1/2n) ≤ 34 thus
|pc − p0| ≤ 2θ
√
n × 1
2
√
3
× 3
4
× 2(3θ+1)2/(n−1).
For θ ≤ 1/2√3 we obtain |pc− p0| ≤ 2θ
√
n and this remains true even for θ > 1/2
√
3.
We now concentrate on n ≥ 4.
The
(
n
k
)
term is upper bounded by
(
n
r
)
with r = n/2. Furthermore, we have
(n
r
) 1
2n
≤
r∏
i=1
(
1 − 1
2i
)
with equality when n is even. Then
log
((n
r
) 1
2n
)
≤
r∑
i=1
log
(
1 − 1
2i
)
≤ −1
2
r∑
i=1
1
i
≤ −1
2
∫ r+1
1
dt
t
≤ − 12 log(r + 1)
≤ − 12 log
n
2
+ 1,
therefore (n
k
) 1
2n
≤
√
2
n + 2 .
Now we have
k
(n
k
) 1
2n
= n
(
n − 1
k − 1
)
1
2n
≤ n
2
√
2
n + 1 ≤
√
n
2
.
We deduce
|pc − p0| ≤ 2θ
√
n × 2(nθ+1)2/(n−1)−3/2.
When θ
√
n < 12 and n ≥ 4 we have (nθ + 1)2/(n − 1)− 32 < 0 so we obtain |pc− p0| ≤
2θ
√
n. When θ
√
n ≥ 12 this also holds since the right-hand side of the inequality is greater
than 1 and the left-hand side is a difference between two probabilities. This proves the
upper bound.
By definition of k we have zk−1(1 − z)n−k ≥ 1/z2n , so we have t k−1(1 − t)n−k ≥
1/2n−1(1 + θ) for any t ∈ [ 12 , z]. From (7) we deduce
max
A
|pc − p0| ≥ θ1 + θ ×
[
k
(n
k
) 1
2n
]
.
If θ = o(1/√n), we have k = n/2 + o(√n) thus ( nk ) ∼ 2n+1/√2πn from the Stirling
formula. Hence maxA |pc− p0| is asymptotically larger than θ
√
n/
√
2π . Since it is also
smaller, this is indeed an equivalent.
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Lemma 16. Let C be a cipher on M = {0, 1}m . For any linear distinguisher (as
depicted in Fig. 4) between C and the ideal cipher C∗ we have
AdvFig. 4 ≤ 3 3
√
n · E(LPC(a, b))+ 3 3
√
n
2m − 1 .
Proof. We first notice that the advantage is zero when a = 0 or b = 0, so the bound
holds. Let us now assume that a = 0 and b = 0. We now take a random permutation
C with the corresponding Z and pC as in the previous lemma. Let δ = E((2Z − 1)2).
(Note that δ = E(LCC(a, b)).) When |2Z − 1| ≤ α we have
|pC − p0| ≤ 2 × α
√
n.
Since (2Z − 1)2 is positive, the probability that |2Z − 1| is greater than α is less than
δ/α2. Hence
|p − p0| ≤ 2 × α
√
n + δ
α2
for any α.
We now fix α = ( δ√
n
)1/3. We obtain |p − p0| ≤ 3 × 3
√
δn.
We recall that δ = E(LPC(a, b)). Since a = 0 and b = 0, we note that E(LPC∗(a, b))
= 1/2m − 1 from Lemma 14 so we can have
|p∗ − p0| ≤ 3 3
√
n
2m − 1 .
We finally use that |p − p∗| ≤ |p − p0| + |p∗ − p0|.
Theorem 17. Let C be a cipher on M = {0, 1}m . For any linear distinguisher (as
depicted in Fig. 4) between C and the ideal cipher C∗ of complexity n we have
AdvFig. 4 ≤ 3 3
√
n · |||[C]2 − [C∗]2|||∞ + n2m − 1 + 3
3
√
n
2m − 1 .
Proof. Actually we have E(LPC∗(a, b)) = 1/2m − 1 and
|E(LPC(a, b))− (1/2m − 1)| ≤ |||[C]2 − [C∗]2|||∞
from Lemma 14. We conclude by using the previous lemma.
So, if the pairwise decorrelation bias has the order of 2−m , linear distinguishers cannot
work against C unless its complexity reaches the order of magnitude of 2m .
6.3. Non-adaptive iterated attacks of order d
Theorems 13 and 17 suggest that we try to generalize them to distinguishers in the
model depicted in Fig. 5 as proposed in [67]. In this model we iterate a d-limited non-
adaptive distinguisher T . We assume that this distinguisher obtains a sample (X, Y )with
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Parameters: a complexity n, a distribution on X , a test T , a set A
Oracle: a permutation c
1: for i from 1 to n do
2: pick X = (X1, . . . , Xd) at random
3: get Y = (c(X1), . . . , c(Xd))
4: set Ti = 0 or 1 with an expected value T (X, Y )
5: end for
6: if (T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ A output 1 otherwise output 0
Fig. 5. Non-adaptive iterated attack of order d.
X = (X1, . . . , Xd) and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yd) such that yi = c(Xi ) for a given distribution
of X . Thus, we can think of a known plaintext attack where X has a plaintext source
distribution (e.g. a uniform distribution) or of a chosen plaintext attack where X has a
given distribution (e.g. in differential cryptanalysis, X = (X1, X1 + a) where X1 has a
uniform distribution). The result of the attack depends on the result of all iterated ones in
a way characterized by a set A. For instance, if A = {0, 1}n\{(0, . . . , 0)} we can define
the differential cryptanalysis (thus of order d = 2). IfA is the set of all (t1, . . . , tn) with
an acceptable sum we can define the linear cryptanalysis (of order d = 1).
One may believe that a cipher is resistant to this model of distinguisher once it has
a small d-wise decorrelation bias. This is wrong as the following example shows. Let
C be a cipher with a perfect d-wise decorrelation. We assume that an instance c of
C is totally defined by d points (xi , yi ) so that C is uniformly distributed in a set of
k = M(M−1) · · · (M−d+1)permutations denoted c1, . . . , ck . From X = (X1, . . . , Xd)
and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yd)we can define I (X, Y ) as the unique index j such that cj (Xi ) = Yi
for i = 1, . . . , d . We let
T (X, Y ) =
{
1 if I (X, Y ) ≡ 0 mod µ,
0 otherwise,
for a given modulus µ = n/a and
A = {0, 1}n\{(0, . . . , 0)}.
If we feed this attack with C or C∗, we have
p ≈ 1
µ
= a
n
or p∗ ≈ 1 −
(
1 − 1
µ
)n
≈ 1 − e−a
for a  n, respectively. Thus Adv can be large even with a relatively large n. This
problem actually comes from the fact that the tests T provide a same expected result for
C and C∗ but a totally different standard deviation.
As a more concrete counterexample we can consider C as the NUT-II decorrelation
module over M = GF(2m) which achieves perfect decorrelation to the order d = 2.
We can consider a kind of differential-linear attack as an iterated attack of order d = 2
which queries random pairs (X1, X2) with a fixed difference X1 ⊕ X2 = a and take Ti
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equal to one bit b · (c(X1)⊕ c(X2)). Then we takeA = {(0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1)}. Due to
the NUT-II structure, Ti is a constant bit thus p = 1, but p∗ ≈ 2.2−m so the advantage
of the distinguisher is close to 1. This simple example extends into a real attack due to
Biham et al. [6] against the COCONUT98 cipher [64].
We can however prove the security when the cipher has a good decorrelation to the
order 2d and an extra assumption about the distribution of X in every iteration.
Theorem 18. Let C be a cipher on a message space of size M such that |||[C]2d −
[C∗]2d |||∞ ≤ ε for some given d ≤ M/2 where C∗ is the perfect cipher. Let us consider
a non-adaptive iterated distinguisher (as depicted in Fig. 5) of order d between C and
C∗ of complexity n. We assume that the distinguisher generates sets of d plaintexts of
independent and equal distribution in all iterations. We have
AdvFig. 5 ≤ 5 3
√(
2δ + 5d
2
2M
+ 3ε
2
)
n2 + nε,
where δ is the probability that any two different iterations send at least one query in
common.
Note that this extra assumption on δmakes sense when considering either known plaintext
attacks or chosen plaintext attacks with a sufficiently large sample space. For instance,
if the distribution of X is uniform, we have δ ≤ d2/M . If X = (X1, X1 + a) with X1
uniformly distributed, we have δ ≤ 3/M .
Proof. Let Z (resp. Z∗) be the probability that the test accepts (X,C(X)) (resp.
(X,C∗(X))), i.e.
Z = EX (T (X,C(X))).
Let p (resp. p∗) be the probability that the attack accepts, i.e.
p = Pr
C
[(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ A].
Since the Ti are independent and with the same expected value Z which only depends
on C , we have
p = EC
( ∑
(t1,...,tn)∈A
Zt1+···+tn (1 − Z)n−(t1+···+tn)
)
.
This can be written
p =
n∑
i=0
ai EC(Zi (1 − Z)n−i )
for some integers ai such that 0 ≤ ai ≤
(
n
i
)
. Obviously the advantage p − p∗ is
maximal when all ai are either 0 or
(
n
i
)
depending on the distributions of Z and Z∗. This
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proves that we can assume an iterated attack to have an acceptance set A of the form
A = {(t1, . . . , tn); t1 + · · · + tn ∈ B}. Let
f (x) =
∑
i∈B
(n
i
)
xi (1 − x)n−i .
We have p = E( f (Z)). We have
f ′(x) =
∑
i∈B
(n
i
) i − nx
x(1 − x) x
i (1 − x)n−i .
The full sum over i = 0, . . . , n is the derivative of the binomial expansion of (x+(1−x))n
which is 1. Hence the full sum is zero. We deduce that
| f ′(x)| ≤
∑
nx≤i≤n
(n
i
) i − nx
x(1 − x) x
i (1 − x)n−i .
Since i ≤ n we have
| f ′(x)| ≤ n
x
∑
nx≤i≤n
(n
i
)
xi (1 − x)n−i .
For x ≥ 12 we deduce that | f ′(x)| ≤ 2n. Since x and 1 − x play a symmetric role we
have | f ′(x)| ≤ 2n for any x . Thus we have | f (Z)− f (Z∗)| ≤ 2n|Z − Z∗|.
The crucial point in the proof is in proving that |Z − Z∗| is small within a high
probability. For this, we need |E(Z)− E(Z∗)| and |V (Z)− V (Z∗)| both to be small.
From Theorem 10 we know that |E(Z)− E(Z∗)| ≤ ε/2. We note that Z2 corresponds
to another test but with 2d entries, namely,
T ((X1, . . . , Xd), (C(X1), . . . ,C(Xd)))
× T ((Xd+1, . . . , X2d), (C(Xd+1), . . . ,C(X2d))),
hence we have |E(Z2) − E((Z∗)2)| ≤ ε/2. Hence |V (Z) − V (Z∗)| ≤ 32ε. Now from
the Tchebichev’s inequality we have
Pr[|Z − E(Z)| > λ] ≤ V (Z)
λ2
for any λ > 0. Since |p − p∗| ≤ E(| f (Z)− f (Z∗)|) we have
|p − p∗| ≤
∑
z,z∗
Pr[Z = z] Pr[Z∗ = z∗]| f (z)− f (z∗)|.
We separate values of z and z∗ for which we have |z− E(Z)| ≤ λ and |z∗ − E(Z∗)| ≤ λ
from others and we get
|p − p∗| ≤ V (Z)
λ2
+ V (Z
∗)
λ2
+ 2n(|E(Z)− E(Z∗)| + 2λ).
We deduce
|p − p∗| ≤ 2V (Z
∗)+ 32ε
λ2
+ 2n
(ε
2
+ 2λ
)
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so, with λ = ((2V (Z∗)+ 32ε)/n)1/3 we have
|p − p∗| ≤ 5
((
2V (Z∗)+ 3ε
2
)
n2
)1/3
+ nε.
Now we have
V (Z∗) =
∑
(x,y)∈A
(x ′ ,y′)∈A
Pr
X
[x] Pr
X
[x ′](Pr
C∗
[(x, x ′) C
∗→ (y, y′)] − Pr
C∗
[x C
∗→ y] Pr
C∗
[x ′ C
∗→ y′])
≤ 1
2
∑
x,y
x ′ ,y′
Pr
X
[x] Pr
X
[x ′]|Pr
C∗
[(x, x ′) C
∗→ (y, y′)] − Pr
C∗
[x C
∗→ y] Pr
C∗
[x ′ C
∗→ y′]|.
The sum over all x and x ′ entries with colliding entries (i.e. with some xi = x ′j ) is less
than δ. The sum over all y and y′ entries with colliding entries and no colliding x and x ′
is less than d2/4M . The sum over all no colliding x and x ′ and no colliding y and y′ is
equal to
1 − δ
2
(
1 − M(M − 1) · · · (M − 2d + 1)
M2(M − 1)2 · · · (M − d + 1)2
)
,
which is less than d2/2(M − d). Thus we have V (Z∗) ≤ δ + d2/4M + d2/2(M − d)
which is less than δ + 5d2/4M when 2d ≤ M .
This theorem proves that we need n = (1/√ε) or n = (√M) to have a meaningful
iterated attack. If we apply it to linear cryptanalysis, this result is thus weaker than
Theorem 17. It is however much more general.
Note that Theorem 18 could be extended with no assumption on δ and with adaptive
attacks as long as we upper bound V (Z∗).
7. Block Cipher Constructions
In the previous sections we have seen that it is enough to achieve a good decorrelation
of low degree in order to resist many practical attack models. Here we show how to
construct practical ciphers with those properties.
7.1. Decorrelation of Feistel Ciphers
In this section we assume that M =M02 where M0 is a group. Thus we can consider
Feistel ciphers on M. We recall the notation  for Feistel schemes. Given functions
f1, . . . , fr over M0 we define
( f1, . . . , fr )(xL , xR) = (zR + fr (zL), zL),
where (zL , zR) = ( f1, . . . , fr−1)(xL , xR) and ()(xL , xR) = (xR, xL), as illustrated
by Fig. 6.
Lemma 19 [40]. Let F1, F2, F3 be three independent uniformly distributed random
functions on M0 and let d be an integer. We consider the cipher C = (F1, F2, F3)
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Fig. 6. Feistel scheme ( f1, f2, f3).
on M =M02 and we compare it with the perfect cipher C∗. For any distinguisher A
between (F1, F2, F3) and C∗ which is limited to d queries, we have
AdvA ≤ d
2
√
#M .
Thus from Theorem 11 we have
‖[(F1, F2, F3)]d − [C∗]d‖a ≤ 2 d
2
√
#M .
The decorrelation ‖ · ‖a-bias of Feistel ciphers can be estimated with the following
lemma.
Lemma 20. Let F1, . . . , Fr (resp. R1, . . . , Rr ) be r independent random functions on
M0 such that ‖[Fi ]d − [Ri ]d‖a ≤ εi (i = 1, . . . , r ). We have
‖[(F1, . . . , Fr )]d − [(R1, . . . , Rr )]d‖a ≤ ε1 + · · · + εr .
Proof. Let Ci = (R1, . . . , Ri , Fi+1, . . . , Fr ). We have C0 = (F1, . . . , Fr ) and
Cr = (R1, . . . , Rr ). Using the triangular inequality we have
‖[(F1, . . . , Fr )]d − [(R1, . . . , Rr )]d‖a ≤
r∑
i=1
‖[Ci−1]d − [Ci ]d‖a .
Let us prove that ‖[Ci−1]d − [Ci ]d‖a ≤ ‖[Fi ]d − [Ri ]d‖a .
Using Theorem 11, we consider a distinguisherA between Ci−1 and Ci with advantage
1
2‖[Ci−1]d − [Ci ]d‖a . We can construct a distinguisher B between Fi and Ri as follows:
1. We simulate the random R1, . . . , Ri−1, Fi+1, . . . , Fr .
2. From an oracle O which implements a function on M0 we construct an oracle
which implements the cipher (R1, . . . , Ri−1,O, Fi+1, . . . , Fr ).
3. We run A on this oracle.
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Obviously this distinguisher between Fi and Ri has the advantage 12‖[Ci−1]d − [Ci ]d‖a .
Since the best possible advantage is 12‖[Fi ]d − [Ri ]d‖a , we obtain the result.
By using Theorem 10, this lemma, the Luby–Rackoff lemma, and the multiplicativity of
decorrelation distances, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 21. Let F1, . . . , Fr be r independent random functions on M0 such that
‖[Fi ]d − [F∗]d‖a ≤ ε (i = 1, . . . , r ) where F∗ is a uniformly distributed random
function on M0. We consider the cipher C = (F1, . . . , Fr ) on M = M02 and we
compare it with the perfect cipher C∗. Let k ≥ 3 be an integer. For any distinguisher A
between C and C∗ which is limited to d queries, we have
AdvA ≤ 12
(
kε + 2d
2
√
#M
)r/k
.
We note that the result holds for practical Feistel schemes as long as rounds use inde-
pendent subkeys and that we can measure the decorrelation biases of round functions.
Proof. By using the simulation technique as in the lemma, we notice that the ‖ · ‖a-
decorrelation bias can only decrease with the number of rounds. Hence the decorrelation
bias of a k-round Feistel scheme is at most kε+2d2/√#M. Next we use the multiplica-
tivity of the ‖ · ‖a-decorrelation bias r/k times. We may have a few extra rounds, but
this can only make the decorrelation bias decrease. We finally use Theorem 11.
We mention that there is a similar result for the ‖ · ‖2 norm in [65].
7.2. Generalization
The construction of decorrelated Feistel schemes based on the Luby–Rackoff theorem
generalizes to arbitrary structures. We provide here a useful lemma taken from [68]
which was freely adapted from Patarin’s “coefficient H techniques” [55].
Lemma 22. Let d be an integer. Let F be a random function from a set M1 to a set
M2. We let X be the subset of Md1 of all (x1, . . . , xd) with pairwise different entries.
We let F∗ be a uniformly distributed random function from M1 to M2. We know that
for all x ∈ X and y ∈Md2 the value [F∗]dx,y is a constant p0 = (#M2)−d . We assume
there exist a subset Y ⊆Md2 and two positive real values ε1 and ε2 such that
(i) |Y|p0 ≥ 1 − ε1,
(ii) ∀x ∈ X , ∀y ∈ Y, [F]dx,y ≥ p0(1 − ε2).
Then we have ‖[F]d − [F∗]d‖a ≤ 2ε1 + 2ε2.
This lemma intuitively means that if [F]dx,y is close to [F∗]dx,y for all x and almost all y,
then the decorrelation bias of F is small.
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Proof. We use the characterization of ‖·‖a-decorrelation bias in terms of best adaptive
distinguisher by using Theorem 11. We let A be one d-limited distinguisher between
F and F∗ with maximum advantage. We can assume without loss of generality that
A is deterministic and never sends the same query twice. The behavior of A is thus
deterministically defined by the oracle responses y = (y1, . . . , yd). We let xi denote the
i th query defined by y1, . . . , yi−1. We let x = (x1, . . . , xd), which is assumed to be in
X . We let A be the set of all rejected yi , i.e. for which A outputs 0. It is straightforward
that
AdvA = −
∑
y∈A
([F]dx,y − [F∗]dx,y).
Next we have
AdvA ≤
∑
y∈A
y∈Y
ε2[F∗]dx,y +
∑
y∈A
y ∈Y
[F∗]dx,y .
The first sum is upper bounded by ε2. For the second sum, we recall that all xi ’s are
pairwise different, so [F∗]dx,y is always equal to p0. This sum is thus less than ε1.
As a first application, here is a quite useful lemma.
Lemma 23. For a random uniformly distributed function F∗ and a random uniformly
distributed permutation C∗ defined over {0, 1}m , we have
‖[F∗]d − [C∗]d‖a ≤ d(d − 1)2−m .
Proof. We use Lemma 22 with F = C∗. We let Y be equal to the set of all pairwise
different outputs. We have
|Y|p0 ≥ 1 − d(d − 1)2 2
−m,
which gives ε1. Since [C∗]dx,y ≥ p0, we can take ε2 = 0 and apply Lemma 22.
As an example of application we prove Lemma 19 in a few lines.
Proof of Lemma 19. Following the Feistel scheme C = (F1, F2, F3), we let
xi = (z0i , z1i ),
z2i = z0i + F1(z1i ),
yi = (z4i , z3i ).
We let E be the event that z3i = z1i + F2(z2i ) and z4i = z2i + F3(z3i ) for all i = 1, . . . , d.
We have [C]dx,y = Pr[E]. We now define
Y = {(y1, . . . , yd); ∀i < j z3i = z3j }.
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(This is a set of non-pathological outputs when computing [C]dx,y .) We can easily check
that Y fulfills the requirements of Lemma 22. Firstly we have
|Y| ≥
(
1 − d(d − 1)
2
2−m/2
)
2md ,
thus we let ε1 = (d(d − 1)/2)2−m/2. Second, for y ∈ Y and any x (with pairwise
different entries), we need to consider [C]dx,y . Let E2 be the event that all z2i ’s are
pairwise different over the distribution of F1. We have
[C]dx,y ≥ Pr[E/E2] Pr[E2].
For computing Pr[E/E2] we know that z3i ’s are pairwise different, as for the z2i ’s. Hence
Pr[E/E2] = 2−md . It is then straightforward that Pr[E2] ≥ 1 − (d(d − 1)/2)2−m/2
which we define to be 1 − ε2. We thus obtain from Lemma 22 that ‖[C]d − [F∗]d‖a ≤
2d(d − 1)2−m/2. From this and Lemma 23 we thus obtain ‖[C]d − [C∗]d‖a ≤ 2d22−m/2
for d ≤ 21+m/2. Since ‖ · ‖a is always less than 2, it also holds for larger d.
This technique can be used for various applications. For instance, we can compare the
decorrelation provided by top-level schemes of the candidates to the AES standardization
process. This has been done in [47]. It was also applied to the Lai–Massey scheme (the
construction of IDEA [36]) in [69]. This is used in Section 8.3.
8. Construction Examples
8.1. COCONUT: A Perfect Decorrelation Design
In this section we define the COCONUT ciphers family which are perfectly decorrelated
ciphers to the order 2. It uses the NUT-II decorrelation module.
The COCONUT ciphers are characterized by some parameters (m, p) where m is the
block length, and p is an irreducible polynomial of degree m in GF(2) (which defines a
representation of the GF(2m) Galois Field). A COCONUT cipher of block length m is
simply a product cipher C1 ◦ C2 ◦ C3 where C1 and C3 are any (possibly weak) ciphers
which can depend on each other, and C2 is an independent cipher based on a 2m-bit key
which consists of two polynomials A and B of degree at most m−1 over GF(2) such that
A = 0. For a given representation of polynomials into m-bit strings, we simply define
C2(x) = A · x + B mod p.
C2 is thus the NUT-II decorrelation module.
Since C2 performs perfect decorrelation to the order 2 and since it is independent
from C1 and C3, any COCONUT cipher is obviously perfectly decorrelated to the order
2. Therefore Theorems 13 and 17 show that COCONUT resists basic differential and
linear cryptanalysis.
One can wonder what C1 and C3 are for. Actually, C2 makes some classes of attacks
provably impractical, but in a way which makes the cipher obviously weak against other
attacks. (C2 is actually a linear function, thus although we can prove it resists any attack
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with a parameter d ≤ 2, it is fairly weak against some attacks with d = 3.) We believe
that all real attacks on any real cipher have an intrinsic order d: that is, they use the d-wise
correlation in the encryption of d messages. Attacks with a large d on real ciphers are
naturally impractical, because the d-wise decorrelation can hardly be analyzed since it
depends on too many factors. Therefore, the COCONUT approach consists in making
the cipher provably resistant against attacks of order at most 2 such as differential or
linear cryptanalysis, and heuristically secure against attacks of higher order by real life
ciphers such as C1 and C3.
Example 24. The COCONUT98 cipher has been proposed in [64] with parameters
m = 64 and p = x64 + x11 + x2 + x + 1. Interestingly, this motivated Wagner to invent
the “boomerang attack” [72] in order to break it. This attack is an iterated attack of
order 4 which uses pretty bad differential properties of C1 and C3. Another attack was
found by Biham et al. [6] based on a non-adaptive iterated attack of order 2 (namely, a
differential-linear attack, see Section. 6.3). This shows that despite the COCONUT98
cipher provably resisting any differential distinguisher as depicted in Fig. 3, one must not
neglect the intrinsic strength of C1 and C3. The existence of attacks when using stronger
C1 and C3 is still an open problem.
For completeness, we mention that an extension of the COCONUT construction (called
DONUT for “Double Operations with NUT”) was proposed by Cheon et al. [13].
8.2. PEANUT: A Partial Decorrelation Design
In this section we define the PEANUT ciphers family, which achieve an example of
partial decorrelation. This family is based on the NUT-IV decorrelation module.
The PEANUT ciphers are characterized by some parameters (m, r, d, p). They are
Feistel ciphers with a block length of m bits (m even) and r rounds. The parameter d is
the order of partial decorrelation that the cipher performs, and p must be a prime number
greater than 2m/2.
The cipher is defined by a key of mrd/2 bits which consists of a sequence of r lists of
d (m/2)-bit numbers, one for each round. In each round, the F function has the form
F(x) = g(k1 · xd−1 + k2 · xd−2 + · · · + kd−1 · x + kd mod p mod 2m/2),
where g is any permutation on the set of all (m/2)-bit numbers.
From Theorem 21 with k = 3 we thus obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 25. Let C be a cipher in the PEANUT family with parameters (m, r, d, p).
We have
‖[C]d − [C∗]d‖a ≤
(
(1 + 2(pd2−(md/2) − 1))3 − 1 + 2d
2
2m/2
)r/3
,
where C∗ is the perfect cipher.
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When p ≈ 2m/2, the upper bound for ‖[C]d − [C∗]d‖a can be approximated by(
6d
(
p − 2m/2)+ 2d2
2m/2
)r/3
.
Example 26. We can use the parameters m = 64, r = 9, d = 2, and p = 232+15. We
obtain that ‖[C]2− [C∗]2‖a ≤ 2−76. Therefore from Theorems 13 and 17 no differential
or linear distinguisher can be efficient. The PEANUT98 cipher has been proposed with
these parameters in [64].
Example 27. In an earlier version of this work [63], we proposed a similar construc-
tion (called PEANUT97) based on the NUT-III decorrelation module which uses prime
numbers smaller than 2m/2. However, the result above does not hold with the ‖ ·‖a norm,
but rather with the ‖·‖2 one. The drawback is that this norm has less friendly theorems for
constructing Feistel ciphers, and in particular we need more rounds to make the cipher
provably secure. (See [65].)
Example 28. The AES candidate DFC was proposed based on the PEANUT construc-
tion (see [17], [18], and [20]). Nominal parameters are m = 128, r = 8, d = 2, and
p = 264 + 13, so we have ‖[C]2 − [C∗]2‖a ≤ 2−115.
8.3. WALNUT: An Alternate Design
The Feistel cipher is based on a round mapping defined by
(xL , xR) → (xR, xL ⊕ F(xR)).
The Feistel scheme benefits from the Luby–Rackoff lemma which enables building a
PEANUT cipher with a provably low decorrelation bias. Instead, we can use the Lai–
Massey scheme on which IDEA relies and which is based on the round mapping
(xL , xR) → (O(xL + F(xL − xR)), xR + F(xL − xR))
as illustrated by Fig. 7 where + is any group addition law, − is the corresponding
subtraction, and O is an orthomorphism for the group, i.e. a permutation such that
x → O(x)− x is also a permutation. As shown in [69], the Luby–Rackoff lemma holds
for this scheme as well with the same bound and same number of rounds. We can thus
construct the WALNUT cipher is the same way as the PEANUT cipher, but with the
Lai–Massey scheme instead of the Feistel one.
9. Conclusion and Further Work
Decorrelation modules are cheap and friendly tools which can strengthen the security
of block ciphers. Actually, we can quantify their security against a class of cryptanaly-
sis which includes differential and linear cryptanalysis. To illustrate this paradigm, we
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Fig. 7. Lai-Massey scheme.
proposed prototype ciphers PEANUT97 [63], COCONUT98 and PEANUT98 [64], and
DFCv2 [20].
One problem with the COCONUT, PEANUT, or WALNUT constructions is that they
require a long key (in order to make the internal random functions independent). In
real-life examples we can generate this long key by using a pseudorandom generator
fed with a short key, but the results on the security based on decorrelation are no longer
valid. However, provided that the pseudorandom generator produces outputs which are
indistinguishable from truly random sequences, we can still prove the security. This
approach has been developed in [17], [18], and [20] with the submission of DFC to the
Advanced Encryption Standard process.
Security against some other generic models of attacks is still open. In particular, we
may investigate security against the Boomerang attack [72], the rectangle attack [5],
or the linear-differential attack [6], [38]. Although we can directly use results from
Section 6.3 with a high order of decorrelation it is not quite clear at this time what
the minimal order of decorrelation required is. Extensions of Theorem 18 to adaptive
attacks is also open. It is further not quite sure that 2d-decorrelation is necessary for
getting provable security against iterated attacks of order d, although we have proven it
is sufficient and that d-decorrelation is not.
It is further problematic to estimate the decorrelation bias of concrete ciphers like
DES or AES candidates unless we approximate them to an ideal model [47].
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. We consider the best adaptive distinguisherA between F and F∗. Without loss
of generality we can assume that it is deterministic and it never asks the same query
twice. Let xi = fi (y1, . . . , yi−1), x = (x1, . . . , xd), and y = (y1, . . . , yd). Let A be
the set of accepted y by the distinguisher. The decorrelation distance is simply twice its
advantage, hence
‖[F]d − [F∗]d‖a = 2
∑
y∈A
([F]dx,y − [F∗]dx,y).
Obviously this sum is maximal when A consists of all y for which we have [F]dx,y >
[F∗]dx,y . Since the full sum is zero, we have
‖[F]d − [F∗]d‖a =
∑
y
∣∣[F]dx,y − [F∗]dx,y∣∣ .
The sample space for F has cardinality 2md . Hence for any multi-point y the probability
[F]dx,y can be written j · 2−md for some integer j which is at most 2md . Let x be a multi-
point. Let Nj be the number of y multi-points such that [F]dx,y = j · 2−md . Note that
[F∗]dx,y = 2−md since all xi are pairwise different. We have
‖[F]d − [F∗]d‖a =
2md∑
j=0
Nj | j − 1|2−md .
Since we have
∑
j Nj = 2md and∑
j
Nj · j2−md =
∑
y
[F]dx,y = 1
we obtain
∑
j Nj | j − 1|2−md = 2N02−md . Hence
‖[F]d − [F∗]d‖a = 2N02−md .
So we only need to count the number of y so that [F]dx,y = 0, i.e. the number of unreached
multi-points y by the (K1, . . . , Kd) → y mapping.
Let zi = K1 + K2xi + · · · + Kd xd−1i mod p and z = (z1, . . . , zd). We have yi =
zi mod 2m so z is a lift of y. If y is unreached, it means that none of its lift are reached. We
can thus map at least one (unreached) z(y) in an injective way to any unreached y multi-
point. Hence we have at least N0 unreached multi-points z by the (K1, . . . , Kd) → z
mapping. We notice that this mapping has no collision: if K = (K1, . . . , Kd) and
K ′ = (K ′1, . . . , K ′d) lead to the same z, they lead to the same y, therefore to the same x ,
so we must have K = K ′ due to interpolation reasons. Hence at least 2md multi-points
z are reached, so we have 2md + N0 ≤ pd . So N0 is less than pd − 2md and we have
‖[F]d − [F∗]d‖a ≤ 2((1 + δ)d − 1).
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Parameters: functions f1, . . . , fd , a set A
Oracle: permutations c and c−1
1: select a fixed direction and message (B1, Z 01) = f1() and get Z 11 = c(Z 01) if B1 = 0
or Z 11 = c−1(Z 01) otherwise
2: calculate a direction and a message (B2, Z 02) = f2(Z 11) and get Z 12 = c(Z 02) if B2 = 0
or Z 12 = c−1(Z 02) otherwise
3: . . .
4: calculate a direction and a message (Bd , Z 0d) = fd(Z 11, . . . , Z 1d−1) and get Z 1d = c(Z 0d)
if Bd = 0 or Z 1d = c−1(Z 0d) otherwise
5: if (Z 11, . . . , Z 1d) ∈ A, output 1, otherwise output 0
Fig. 8. A general d-limited distinguisher with chosen inputs or outputs.
Appendix B. On Super-Pseudorandomness
Super-pseudorandomness addresses the distinguishability of random permutations with
distinguishers which can submit inputs or outputs to the oracle and get the corresponding
output or input in return. Figure 8 depicts a general distinguisher limited to d queries
which are either chosen inputs or chosen outputs. For completeness we state here the
results without a proof.
In the same way that we define the ‖ · ‖a norm with (4), we define a ‖ · ‖s norm on
RMd×Md by
‖A‖s = max
b1∈{0,1}
max
z01
∑
z11
· · · max
bd∈{0,1}
max
z0d
∑
z1d
|A
(z
b1
1 ,...,z
bd
d ),(z
1−b1
1 ,...,z
1−bd
d )
|.
We can transform the matrix A into a matrix A¯ on RMd1×Md where M1 = {0, 1} ×M
by
A¯((b1,z01),...,(bd ,z0d )),(z11,...,z1d ) = A(zb11 ,...,zbdd ),(z1−b11 ,...,z1−bdd ).
Then we have ‖A‖s = ‖ A¯‖a . We easily deduce that
(i) ‖ · ‖s is actually a matrix norm,
(ii) we have ‖|A‖|∞ ≤ ‖A‖a ≤ ‖A‖s for any A,
(iii) the following equivalent of Theorem 9 holds.
Theorem 29 [70]. Let d be an integer and let C be a cipher. The best d-limited distin-
guisher (as depicted in Fig. 8) for C is such that
AdvFig. 8 = 12‖[C]d − [C∗]d‖s,
where C∗ is the perfect cipher.
The equivalent of Lemma 22 is as follows.
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Lemma 30 [68]. Let d be an integer. Let C be a random permutation on a setM. We
let X be the subset of Md of all (x1, . . . , xd) with pairwise different entries. We let C∗
be a uniformly distributed random permutation on M. We know that for all x, y ∈ X ,
the value [C∗]dx,y is a constant p0. If there exists a positive real value ε such that
∀x, y ∈ X , [C]dx,y ≥ p0(1 − ε),
then we have ‖[C]d − [C∗]d‖s ≤ 2ε. Similarly, if there exists a positive real value ε such
that
∀x, y ∈ X , [C]dx,y ≥
1 − ε
#Md ,
then we have ‖[C]d − [C∗]d‖s ≤ 2ε + d2/#M.
Lemma 19 can also be stated in terms of super-pseudorandomness.
Lemma 31 [40]. Let F1, F2, F3, F4 be four independent uniformly distributed random
functions onM0 and let d be an integer. We consider the cipher C = (F1, F2, F3, F4)
on M =M02 and we compare it with the perfect cipher C∗. For any distinguisher A
between (F1, F2, F3, F4) and C∗ which is limited to d chosen inputs or outputs, we
have
AdvA ≤ d
2
√
#M .
The consequence is the following equivalent of Theorem 21.
Theorem 32 [70]. Let F1, . . . , Fr be r independent random functions on M0 such
that ‖[Fi ]d − [F∗]d‖a ≤ ε (i = 1, . . . , r ) where F∗ is a uniformly distributed random
function on M0. We consider the cipher C = (F1, . . . , Fr ) on M = M02 and we
compare it with the perfect cipher C∗. Let k ≥ 4 be an integer. For any distinguisher A
between C and C∗ which is limited to d chosen inputs or outputs, we have
AdvA ≤ 12
(
kε + 2d
2
√
#M
)r/k
.
Finally, Theorem 25 extends as follows.
Theorem 33. Let C be a cipher in the PEANUT family with parameters (m, r, d, p).
We have
‖[C]d − [C∗]d‖s ≤ ((1 + 2(pd2−md/2 − 1))4 − 1 + 2d2/2m/2)r/4,
where C∗ is the perfect cipher.
The parameters of PEANUT98 lead to ‖[C]2− [C∗]2‖s ≤ 2−48. The parameters of DFC
lead to ‖[C]2 − [C∗]2‖s ≤ 2−112.
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